“The immediate cause of the problem was failure by three key personnel, and not structural flaws. My assessment is that this was an error of judgment, rather than any wilful attempt to mislead,” Mr Thornton concluded. 

“There is no evidence, nor is it in my view plausible, that there was any deliberate intent to mislead the States and the media as to the cost of the project... the evidence is that they simply regarded the information as ‘just’ being an increase in costs and/or a problem that would have to be addressed at some future point.”  

No disciplinary action has been recommended for currently employed civil servants, with the three staff identified as being at the centre of the failure no longer on the public payroll. 

Mark de Garis, the island’s civil service boss, has labelled the blunder “extraordinary” and “completely unacceptable”. 

He said it was also “unexpected” as it called into question what the States considered to be “robust processes in place for the management of capital projects”. 

The major review was ordered by Mr de Garis, which has now left him relieved after finding that “it confirms the processes, structures and governance we have in place are fit for purpose”. 

He said senior officials are working to improve accountability and cost reporting internally, in line with the report’s recommendations.  

Pictured: The second phase of the hospital modernisation project promises a large expansion to capacity and improvements to facilities for staff and patients.

Meanwhile, Policy & Resources President Deputy Lyndon Trott noted that States projects routinely went over budget two decades ago but changes since then, and the findings of the report, have confirmed his original view that existing procedures are adequate.  

Deputy Trott said he was “shocked” when the figures, and the delay in their reporting, was presented to the committee but is satisfied that the hospital scandal is an “exceptional case". 

“But it is an extremely disappointing and unacceptable one, and I’ve no doubt that is also the view of States Members and islanders,” he added.  

“It is important to remember this relates to a potential cost increase, but not an actual overspend, and we are still of the view that the project can and should be completed within its approved budget.”  

Health President Deputy Al Brouard also bemoaned the “unacceptable behaviour which has had a major effect on an essential project.  

“The focus now for our committee and officers is to do everything possible to keep phase two of the hospital modernisation project within the original cost envelope agreed by the States or return the matter to the Assembly.” 

Pictured: The Head of the Public Service, Mark de Garis, was “inexplicably” kept in the dark about the revised costs after they became more widely known, the report found.  

Timeline  

Pictured: The States debated funding for the separate Les Ozouets project unaware that costs may exceed what it had approved for the hospital just months before.

Key findings 

Mr Thornton said officers had no choice but to operate and make decisions using “unreliable and inaccurate information” which added significant risk to the hospital project. 

Politicians scrutinising the project did not have a “correct understanding” of its costs and were therefore denied the chance to review its scope. 

However, he did find there was confusion generally among officers regarding the different design stages of the project, and therefore the associated estimated costs. Presentations to deputies were based on the May 2022 estimates, rather than on newer designs which had been signed off that later summer.  

Mr Thornton said this was “unacceptable” but noted the design of the project was continually evolving, and there was a “looseness” around its governance “which gave officers discretion (or at least the appearance of a discretion) not to report the matter” immediately.  

Political failings 

He also criticised the political members of HSC for not disclosing the matter to P&R fast enough. Waiting for the revised figures to be verified between December and early January was acceptable but waiting until mid-February was not. 

“On 16 January 2024 it was clear to all that it was a problem, and a significant one, that it was not going to be easily addressed (that value engineering was not going to solve the issue), and indeed it was far worse than first feared,” Mr Thornton said.  

“At this point I consider that there was a duty to notify the Policy & Resources Committee both of the impact on the project cost, but more importantly because by then it was beyond dispute that the States had taken their October decision on the basis of incorrect figures.”

Health did not request a meeting with the senior committee until the day after funding was rubber stamped by the States for the hospital project and deputies had approved multi-million-pound funding for the post-16 education campus at Les Ozouets. 

“It was not until 25 January, and crucially the day after the education debate, that a request for a meeting with Policy & Resources was made and was issued without specifying the problem. It was not until 27 February that the joint meeting was held. By this time Policy & Resources were of course aware of the matter, having been advised by the Head of the Public Service on 13 February, who inexplicably had only been notified himself on 9 February,” he said. 

“I can understand why there is significant disquiet and some anger, particularly from elected members as to the amount of time that elapsed... however, I do not consider that any currently employed officer has acted in a way that could be regarded as misconduct or should be subject to sanction.” 

Recommendations 

Mr Thornton said there needs to be a “cultural change in thinking a decision making” so risks are communicated sooner and factored into projects to not damage the overall interests of the States.  

Making accountability and reporting clearer, fully understood by all parties and applied “across all decision making of the States” will alert key figures to trouble sooner to prevent future mishaps. 

This can be achieved by introducing a project manual featuring best practice and possibly by reintroducing Chief Officers to each committee, which were abolished in the last political term. 

Project contracts should also be standardised for consultants and contractors to ensure consistency and avoid unwelcome surprises when the final bill is produced.  

Much political noise was made about how no deputy from HSC sat on the project governance board, but Mr Thornton has advised this was not necessary and requiring politicians to sit on these boards can create conflicts of interest, with scrutiny already expected from deputies through oversight of all documentation, or lack thereof. 

He said only high calibre professionals should be appointed to lead projects at an operational level and “should be drawn from a small pool of experienced internally appointed senior officers, who have received proper training and have gained experience of running projects”. 

Formal appointment letters stating the role, responsibility and accountabilities would also improve reporting and delivery, he added. 

“I consider that lines of reporting also need to be clarified and strengthened amongst officers at senior level in order that they are fully aware of the need to escalate matters to ensure better decision making, accountability and full transparency of decision making.” 

“Whilst there will always be room for adjustments to address problems where they have arisen, there is not much wrong with the current project procedures including the three pathways which currently make up the components of project governance,” Mr Thornton concluded.  

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